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ABSTRACT  
 
Egypt has a very expensive and extensive food subsidy system representing a 
heavy burden on the State’s public budget. At the same time, however, 
these subsidies secure the livelihood of the most vulnerable part of the 
Egyptian population. While this situation is not sustainable in its current 
form, no agreement on the extent of the reforms needed and how they 
should be conducted has yet been reached. This research aims to examine 
the different viewpoints of stakeholders involved in this issue as well as it 
intends to investigate the position of different international agencies on 
food subsidies in general, and in Egypt in particular. Furthermore, does this 
thesis look at how international agencies influence government decisions 
on food subsidy reforms and it attempts to determine the other factors of 
importance in this matter. The analysis is being based on publications from 
these institutions and on interviews conducted with stakeholders involved 
in food subsidies reforms. This allowed us to conclude that all actors agree 
on the fact that the Egyptian food subsidy system needs to be reformed due 
to its high cost and because it is not sufficiently targeted and suffers 
important leakages. Regarding the changes that should be introduced, two 
main positions can be identified; the financial institutions advocate for an 
immediate switch to a less costly cash transfer system, while the UN 
organizations, although not against cash transfers, argue that those are not 
sufficient in protecting the livelihood of the poor in Egypt and are rather in 
favor of keeping and improving the current system.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. A historical background on food subsidies  
The Egyptian food subsidy system can be divided into two components. The first one 
is the subsidy for baladi bread1 (82% extraction) and flour. These products are 
available for everybody and theoretically limited to 3 loaves a person, in practice, 
however, there is no limitation on the quantity that can be purchased by the people. 
Until recently, the government was providing flour at a subsidized price to the 
bakeries which would bake the bread and sell it at a subsidized price of 5 Piasters 
(less than 0.1 US$) instead of the 25 Piasters market price2. Bread is a major 
component of the daily diet of Egyptians, which is well illustrated by its name in the 
Egyptian dialect “aïsh” which also signifies “life”. This designation reflects how 
central bread is in Egypt; Egyptians have a culture of bread which is found in every 
meals.  In 2009 subsidies on bread and flour represented 76.37% (10 billion EGP) of 
the total expenditure for food subsidies.  
The second component includes basic goods available at a very low price through a 
ration card or a smart card. Each household possessing this card is entitled to specific 
quotas of rice, cooking oil, sugar and tea that they can purchase in specific retail 
outlets called “tamwin” which mean supply in Arabic. There are two types of ration 
cards; the green card and the red card. While the first is aimed at the poorest 
households and offers a higher subsidy rate, the second card targets less vulnerable 
households which are entitled to a lower subsidy rate. In practice, 93% percent of the 
card owners benefit from the green (full subsidized) card. This shows already the lack 
                                                
1 Baladi bread is the typical Egyptian pita bread. Made of whole wheat, the loaves are about 15-20 cm 
in diameter and 1-2 cm thick.  
2 The recent reform on the supply chain of the baladi bread will be detailed in section 5.  
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of targeting according to the economic level of the recipients in the system. The 
expenses for rationed goods in 2009 was 3.1 billion EGP. (Ramadan and Thomas, 
2011) 
 
The system of consumer food subsidies has first been introduced during the Second 
World War to help Egyptians in a time when goods were scarce and inflation high. 
Subsequently food subsidies remained as a social safety net which was to guarantee a 
stable price for certain food products in time of economic hardship and more 
specifically to safeguard food-price inflation. It has been used to alleviate food 
insecurity at the household level and to guarantee a minimum calorie intake for the 
most vulnerable.  (Ramadan and Thomas, 2011; Trego, 2011)  
In the fifties, under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the country was heading towards 
a system of state-led socialism and the subsidy program was expanded. As part of the 
new system established, farmers were obligated to give off part or all of their harvest 
at prices below the free-market price destined to redistribution. The government of 
Nasser further expanded the food subsidy system in the 1960’s as part of a broader 
consumer welfare program which was also subsidizing housing, energy, water, health, 
education and other non-food goods like soap and cigarettes. During this period, 
ration cards were introduced for a small number of items. The card was initially 
designed at quantity rationing against commodity shortages and did not necessarily 
involve price subsidies. Although it was quite extensive, the food subsidy program 
under Nasser remained at a modest percentage of the state budget. (Ahmed et al. 
2001) This can probably partly be attributed to the fact that producers had to bear a 
part of the burden of the subsidies themselves. 
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In 1970, when Sadat came to the power after the death of Nasser, the food subsidy 
system was one of the few social policies that that were not reversed. The program 
was even extended to 18 new food items including beans, lentils, frozen fish, meat, 
and chicken, as well as rice and yellow maize. However, those subsidy expansions 
became more and more costly due the international context. Because of Nasser’s 
agricultural policy which was not encouraging production and the rising population, 
Egypt became highly dependent upon wheat imports and suffered a lot from the world 
wheat price which quadrupled between 1972 and 1973 leading to severe problems of 
deficit. At this time, expenditures on food subsidies augmented drastically rising from 
0.2 percent to 14 percent of the overall government expenditure. It was under Sadat 
and his Infitah3 policy when Egypt first started with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1976 in order to negotiate the Egyptian external debt. An agreement would 
require a package of economic reforms and a program of structural adjustment. The 
IMF at this time identified the food subsidies as an area quite suitable for reducing 
government expenses. After completing negotiations with the IMF in January 1977, 
Sadat announced a suppression of the subsidies of basic foodstuffs. This decision 
provoked violent “bread riots” which were threatening the stability of the regime in 
such a way that the decision of cutting food subsidies had to be reversed. (Ahmed et 
al. 2001; Trego, 2011) 
When Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981, the burden caused by food subsidies on the 
budget had become unsustainable and thus had to be reduced. Subsequently a careful 
subsidy reform was conduced; gradually and without any previous announcements,  
some subsidized items were removed from the ration card. The number of subsidized 
items was reduced from nearly twenty to merely four in a dozen of years. Subsidized 
                                                
3 The Infitah was President Sadat’s policy of opening the country to private investment. 
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foods consumed mainly by higher income groups like meat, chicken, fish and others 
were removed in a move to better target the poorest part of the population. It was also 
under the reign of Mubarak that a partial ration card for higher-income households 
was introduced and that the new-borns were not added on the card after 1989. In 
1991, the Government of Egypt (GoE) concluded an agreement with the IMF and the 
World Bank, known as Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program  
(ERSAP), which increased the necessity of macroeconomic cleansing. (African 
Development Bank Group, 2010) Food subsidies were also part of the targeted 
reduction of public intervention on the free market. (Omar, 2012)  It resulted that by 
2000, only 67 percent of the population held a ration card (against 93 percent in 
1990). In parallel, the government also addressed the bread subsidies; the size of the 
loaf was decreased from 160 to 135 grams and the price increased gradually to be 
until it reached five Piasters from its initial price of one Piaster. In order to implement 
this smoothly, the method used was to introduce a more expensive and better quality 
loaf and then progressively decrease its quality and then eliminate the cheapest loaf. 
Thereby, the cost of food subsidies declined to 2.5 billion EGP in 1991/92 which 
represented 5.5% of the total government expenditure.  (Gutner 2002; Trego 2011) 
In the twenty-first century, the food-subsidy system became primordial for the welfare 
of the population as Egypt faced many periods of significant food price increase. 
First, in 2003, the devaluation of the Egyptian Pound - the country switched from a 
fixed to a flexible exchange rate - brought about an inflation of 28 percent. 
Furthermore has the food market been more severely affected by a inflation in this 
sector of nearly 38 percent. Then, in 2007–08, food prices rose in conjunction with 
the international trend. Egypt as a net food importer was affected badly by this global 
rise in food prices. (Trego 2011) Finally, in its current post-revolutionary situation, 
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Egypt is facing a new phase of hardship with high inflation rates. The Egyptian 
situation is therefore really complex and it can be seen that attempts to reform the 
food subsidy system are very sensitive politically as well as socially. Numerous 
reform attemps under Mubarak's regime are illustrative of the complexity of the issue. 
After reducing the items and recipients of subsidies, he had to expand them again 
after the inflation of 2003. A 10 Piasters loaf in addition to the 5 Piasters loaf of bread 
was introduced to give extra affordable bread choices to the population. In 2004, the 
government reintroduced new items on the ration card like rice, ghee, pasta, beans, 
lentils, tea, and additional quantities of edible oil. These changes again entailed a raise 
in expenditures for food subsidies. In 2004, in order to focus on economic reforms, 
the President appointed Ahmed Nazif as a Prime Minister. As part of larger economic 
reform, Nazif sought to reform the subsidy system. His cabinet studied ways to 
distribute food subsidies to the needy population in a better-targeted manner. They 
sought in particular to replace in-kind subsidies by cash transfers. (Trego, 2011) In 
December 2007, Prime Minister Nazif announced the planned transition to a cash-
transfer system for food subsidies. The response of the public to this proposal was 
negative and Hosni Mubarak quickly reacted to the public uproar and proclaimed that 
he would not reform the food subsidy system. The discussion on switching to a cash 
subsidy system was thus postponed. The global food-price crisis also played a role in 
dropping the idea of cash transfers.  (Trego, 2011) Previous expansion of the 
subsidized food basket had also been revised as it appears they were not economically 
efficient and were failing to alleviate poverty. Thus in 2006, the higher quality bread 
has been eliminated as well as other commodities on the ration card; ghee, pasta, 
beans, and lentils have been removed from the ration card and replaced with an 
additional portion of sugar.  
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1.2. Statement of the problem  
Egypt is facing a deep economic crisis following the revolution of January 2011 that 
led to the removal of President Hosni Mubarak who has been in power for 30 years. 
The country’s foreign currency reserves are diminishing rapidly, dropping from $36 
billion in 2011 to $14 billion at the end of March 2013. Also, the budget deficit 
reached 11 percent of the GDP compared to about 7 percent in 2010. (Terra Lawson-
Remer, 2013) Such a critical economic situation rekindles the government’s 
responsibility to take measures to rebalance the fiscal deficit. The reforms needed 
would encompass two main aspects: the increase of revenues as well as the reduction 
of public expenditure. In 2008/09, food subsidies accounted for 6.1 % of the total 
government expenditure (Korayem, 2013) and nearly 2% of the GDP. (World Bank, 
2013)  This sector counts then for a relevant share of the government spending and is 
therefore not sustainable in its current form.  
Reforming food subsidies is, however, quite a challenge for any post-revolution 
governments. Conflicting pressures are complicating the issue: on the one side are  
international financial agencies, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB) pressuring for strong reforms that include expenditure reductions, 
which would probably affect food subsidies. Those reforms are deemed necessary if 
Egypt wants to accede to the IMF’s $4.8 billion loan, which would secure the 
country’s access to other loans from international banks as well as reassure investors. 
On the other side stands the Egyptian population, the poor in particular, that are 
already facing a deterioration of their living conditions due to the desolate economic 
situation of the country. The Egyptian population’s firm position on this issue can be 
illustrated by the 2011 revolution’s main slogan which was “bread, freedom and 
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social justice!” Since food subsidies ensure food security for certain Egyptian 
households, and on the other side a mean of redistribution, cutting them might be 
perceived as going against two of the three fundamental demands the Egyptian people 
voiced during the January 2011 revolution. This means that reforms on food subsidies 
might lead to revolts and “bread riots”, like it has already been the case in Egypt in 
the past. More popular revolts are barely affordable for any of the successive 
governments, which are likely to be fragile, highly contested and facing continuous  
turmoil. Under the reign of Morsi who hails from the Muslim Brotherhood, the IMF 
was pushing the government of Egypt (GoE) to adopt additional economic reforms 
(Ahram, 03.04.2013a) while the opposition speaking out against those reforms and 
organized protests against the IMF loan, claiming it would be too much of a burden 
for the country. (Ahram, 03.04.2013b) 
The main issue at hand is that there is an acknowledged need for reform when it 
comes to food subsidies to help cut government expenditure. However, the different 
parties involved in taking decision – the government, the Egyptian people, and 
international organizations – have different interests regarding this issue and it will be 
very difficult to find an agreement on how this reform should be conducted. This is 
why any successive government will find itself in the middle of at least two opposing 
views and pressures concerning the food subsidy policy it has to adopt. However, 
international organizations do not only play a pressure role, agencies like the World 
Food Programme (WFP) mainly or the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the 
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) are also providing assistance to the 
government and, at the same time, to the population. They do not, however, have the 
instruments to impose anything on the Egyptian government and thus rather play a 
role of technical assistance.  
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This issue is then regrouping three levels; society, domestic policy and global policy. 
It is therefore an interesting study case of the interaction of these three levels in the 
decision making process. In order to do so, this thesis will first investigate the need 
for food subsidies in Egypt and how this sector can be reformed. It will then examine 
the position of different international agencies on the food subsidy policies and reform 
focusing on the IMF, the World Bank and the WFP. It will also seek to examine to 
what extent they affect the Egyptian government’s decision making process and how 
the negotiations are being conducted. It focuses thus mainly on the process that on the 
content of reform. 
The objective is to get a clearer idea on the matter of food subsidy reform process in 
Egypt. The thesis seeks to understand the settings for policy making in this field, with 
a particular attention on the global environment and the influence of international 
organizations.   
To conduct this research, a first part of this study has provided a background on the 
historical context of the Egyptian food-subsidy system, including the role of food-
price inflation, and the affect of the politico-economic situation. In the subsequent 
chapter, a literature review on food security and the role of food subsidies will be 
given in order to understand the raison d’être of these subsidies. This will be linked 
with the duty of the State toward its citizens and the social contract. An economic 
perspective will also be included in the impact of subsidies on food prices and the 
demand and supply equilibrium. In the second part of this chapter, food subsidy 
policies in Egypt will be examined focusing on the need for food subsidies in the 
current situation to ensure food security for the Egyptian households and on the 
necessity for a reform of the food subsidy system. The third part will look into what 
has been written about the international organizations and their policies toward food 
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subsidies in order to understand what is their position in this regard. In the fourth part, 
the data collected during the field investigation will be described. They will then be 
analyzed in relation to the problematic in the fifth part. A conclusion will bring a 
synthesized answer to the research question.  
 
 
2. Hypothesis  
 
As a point of departure, I assume that food subsidies in Egypt are necessary, given the 
level of poverty in the country. Researchers estimate that 25 per cent of the Egyptian 
population lives below the poverty line. (Abdel-Razek, 2011) They can therefore not 
afford food at a market price that is not only unstable but also significantly higher 
than subsidized prices. The food-subsidy system in Egypt, however, needs to be 
reformed since it benefits mostly the richest quintile with access to subsidies, while 
some of the most needy household are excluded from the subsidy system altogether. 
(World Bank, 2012) Thus the subsidy system in Egypt needs to develop a strategy 
that targets the most vulnerable households rather than the not so needy ones, not least 
because the burden that food subsidies are imposing on the state's budget, already in 
deficit, is unsustainable for the government.  
 
Regarding the international organizations, I assume that the financial organizations 
are in favor of cuts in food-subsidies in order to ‘clean up’ the state budget. Although 
IMF does not give fixed conditions for its loans, it expects substantial budgetary 
measures and subsidies are form a significant part of the expenditures that are most 
suitable – or the less unsuitable - for cuts. They have thus a fiscal approach of the 
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problem. UN agencies, quite the contrary, are more concerned about human 
development and protection indexes. It can be assumed that the WFP will give 
priority to households’ food security. Their concerns are focused mainly on the 
nutritional aspects. The influence of the IMF on the Egyptian government can 
expected to be quite strong, since its recommendations are preconditions for its loan. 
However, the government is reluctant to engage in important reforms that might 
compromise its fragile stability. On the other side, The WFP, FAO and the UNDP 
have no leverage towards the Egyptian government. They can, however, influence it 
and provide much needed assistance and expertise.  
The problematic of reforming food subsidies is further complicated by the existence 
of two dominating but conflicting rationales; the one focused on cutting expenditures, 
in order to balance the budget, advocate for a minimal subsidy program; while the 
others, who care about the living conditions of the people, defend a minimal living 
standard for the most vulnerable part of the population. The government is quite 
obviously stuck between those two rationales, whose contradictory character 
paralyzes any substantial solution to the problem of food subsidies that would be 
acceptable for the population and financially sustainable for the government. 
Although the pressure of IMF on the government for reforms of the subsidy system is 
strong, the successive governments are reluctant to start such a sensitive reform that 
might cost them a lot politically.  
 
3. Methodology  
In order to investigate the position of international agencies on food subsidies and 
how they influence Egyptian politics, a desk and qualitative research will be 
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conducted based on reports and publications from international organizations and 
semi-directed interviews. A focus will be placed on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) because of the role they play in shaping government 
expenditure and macroeconomic reforms. On the other hand, United Nations 
organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and to a 
smaller extent UNICEF will be analyzed due to their involvement in food security 
issues. 
 
A first part of the research was conducted using published data including reports from 
the pre-cited organizations, academic research, newspaper articles as well as official 
decrees and statements. In a second stage, interviews were conducted with officials 
from the above mentioned agencies, with the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade as 
well as with experts. The information provided by the interviews will complete the 
data collected previously. The analysis of all those data combined will lead to 
conclusions that answer the research questions.  
A shortcoming in the research is however the lack of possibilities for interviews from 
a larger rank of ministries or governmental officials in reason of their reluctance to 
talk about this sensitive issue and also because of the lack of possibilities to get into 
contact with such officials. 
Another weakness of the research is that it does not bring the point of view from the 
IMF and WB through a personal interview, I tried however to reflect their opinion a 
well as possible from a large panel of publication from those agencies.  
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4. Literature review 
4.1 The rational of food subsidies  
4.1.1. Food security and role of subsidies 
Food security is defined by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as: “when 
all people, at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and 
nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and 
stability.” (CFS, 2012, p.4) Consumer food subsidies seek to address the three last 
pillars, while the first pillar is included in the government’s agricultural policy. The 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) describes food subsidies as “a common 
method of attempting to reduce food insecurity” (FAO website). They are indeed 
commonly motivated by household-level food security concerns. Those consumer-
oriented food subsidy programs, mainly found in developing countries, were launched 
with the goal of assuring consumers access to a specified quantity of one or more food 
commodities at stable prices fixed by the government. Such a guarantee is a key 
consideration for vulnerable households, since price fluctuations, due to global or 
domestic factors, is the main reason for food insecurities. Many of these programs 
were initiated or expanded during war times or following poor harvests or extreme 
foreign exchange crises. The principal purpose of the strategy, when initiated, was 
clearly one of reducing uncertainty at a household-level concerning the ability to 
access a minimum amount of basic food staples. (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988) Consumer 
subsidy programs and policies’ roles differ among countries and over time. In most of 
the cases the goal is akin to the following: to improve the real purchasing power of all 
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or certain groups of consumers by making some basic food items available at below-
market prices; to ensure minimum calorie and nutrient efficiencies for “at risk” 
population groups like children and pregnant women or larger groups like “the poor”; 
to guarantee social and political stability especially in countries where the government 
has little legitimacy; as a form of partial wage compensation for the low salaries of 
the Egyptian population. (Adams, 2000; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988) It has been 
observed (Pinstrup Anderson, 1988) that food consumption by low-income 
households is being affected by food subsidies, which lower food prices and thus raise 
the relative incomes and food security of the households. The income and price 
elasticity for staple foods tend to be larger among the poorest. This means that food 
price subsidies result in increasing household food consumption and their caloric 
intake.    
 
When food subsidies are regarded from a food security perspective, it is important to 
mention that food subsidy programs can also affect the food availability in the country 
by affecting agricultural production. In fact, under Nasser, farmers participated in 
agricultural cooperatives which mandated obligatory delivery of part or all of their 
production at prices below the free-market price. Growth in wheat production was 
slow during this time, whereas population growth was fast. It resulted that in 1963 
wheat imports exceeded domestic production and lead to an increase in the balance of 
payment’s deficit. In the early 1980s, Egypt was only 20 percent self-sufficient in 
wheat, an incidence that had to be reversed, this is why the government began to 
address domestic agricultural production. In the mid-1980s, a national program started 
to distribute high-yielding long-spike wheat varieties to farmers, substantially 
increasing yields. In the 1990s, the agricultural sector was liberalized, which resulted 
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in further increases in productivity. Egypt increased its relative domestic production 
so that by 2000 it was 50 percent self-sufficient in wheat. (Croppenstedt et al. 2006)  
 
4.1.2. Duty of the state and social contract  
The notion of social contract is defined in political philosophy as an “agreement, 
between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each”. Subsidy 
policies need also to be studied in the framework of the state’s social policy and the 
social contract as well as its relationship with the market. It is therefore important to 
address the literature concerning the relationship between the market and the state as 
well as the state and its citizens. The market mechanism is defined by Dasgupta 
(1993) as a “resource allocation mechanism in which the State restricts its activities in 
the socio-economic sphere to facilitating the operation of private markets. This it does 
by developing and enforcing commercial laws [...], protecting private property rights 
[...], and so forth.” The author emphasizes, however, that generally, under the terms of 
the social contract, the state is obliged to do more than merely sustain the market 
mechanism. State intervention is indeed often necessary to balance dangers stemming 
from the free market that might leave aside the less competitive. The state can ensure 
a minimal welfare level for its citizens. Its main goal is to assist the disadvantaged and 
regain a balance between efficiency and equity. Welfare system or social policies are 
concerned with the public provision of goods and services. Interventions are aimed to 
guarantee access to a range of basic goods and services to improve wellbeing and 
achieve socially defined objectives. This can be provided through different 
mechanisms such as direct state provision, publicly financed payment systems, and 
government mandates to other organizations to provide services and to reduce 
insecurity or insure against risk in order to help vulnerable households or individuals 
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to resist shocks, such as, serious illnesses, disability or unemployment and to smooth 
consumption and income. The extent of the state intervention and the issue of state 
versus market have been in the center of the economic development discussions for 
many decades. (Omar, 2013) Welfare systems are to be seen as part of the social 
contract between the state and its citizens where the state engages in providing certain 
goods and services in return for more or less higher taxes paid by the citizens and low 
revenues. Also, the provision of these goods and services provide the state with a 
certain political legitimacy. In the decades after World War II, the welfare system has 
reached a relative level of maturity in many of the developed countries. During this 
period, most industrialized Western democracies had to adopt policies of income 
security and have provided their citizens with free or subsidized services in many 
areas such as education, health, housing and employment. (Omar, 2013)  
In Egypt, it is mainly during Nasser’s rule that a social contract between state and 
society began to emerge, emphasizing redistribution and equity as key principles 
justifying mechanisms such as consumer food subsidies. (Yousef, 2004) Yousef 
(2004) defines the type of social contract that was found in Egypt and other MENA 
countries from de 1940's to the 1970's as an “interventionist-redistributive social 
contract” which came with a “centralized, hierarchical, and tightly regulated 
corporatist structure of interest representation in the first decade after independence” 
(p.7). He sees this kind of system as a consequence of the extreme poverty that 
prevailed in the first half of the 20th century and very meager health care, education, 
nutrition and life expectancy. In Egypt, consumer subsidies became an implicit part of 
the social contract between the population and its government. It is part of the 
government’s commitment to provide job opportunities and a minimum standard of 
living at affordable prices to alleviate the dire economic situation of many households 
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against accepting limitations on freedoms and ensuring political stability. It 
contributes therefore to the survival of the government and any attempt to reduce or 
eliminate this service might be perceived as a breach to the government’s 
commitment for social provision and would break this social contract. This would 
generate unrest of a population whose living became a hardship and who is expecting 
a basic ration of food from its ruler.  (Omar, 2013) 
 
4.1.3 Food subsidies and market function  
From an economic point of view, food subsidy programs imply that government 
intervention in the free market is such that food prices are kept lower to some or all 
consumers than they would be without it. There are different conflicting economic 
approaches regarding food subsidies and their implication on the market’s 
functioning. In the early 1980’s, the neoclassical approach was most prevalent as it 
was the system encouraged by the Bretton Woods Institutions and formed part of the 
“Washington Consensus”. Those financial institutions would incite developing 
countries to remove general subsidies and replace them with targeted subsidies in the 
framework of the Structural Adjustment and Economic Stabilization policies 
(SAESP) (Dinit and Lippit). Those SAESP were widely recommended to developing 
countries in the 1980’ and 1990’ in order to receive IMF and WB’s structural 
adjustment loans. Reductions of general subsidies were advocated as important 
preconditions for such loans in order to reduce the deficit and improve the efficiency 
through “getting the prices right”. The main theoretical bases of those policies are the 
following macroeconomic paradigms; Supply-side; Rational Expectations and New 
Neoclassical Political Economy. (Dinit and Lippit) First, the Supply-Side approach 
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emphasizes that state intervention leads to more expenditure than tax revenues; it 
implies that expenditures should be borne by higher taxes. However, high taxes have 
a negative effect on investments and on economic growth. If investment goes down, 
the tax base diminishes, which in turn leads to lower taxes revenues. It is therefore 
important to keep a tax level that would generate an optimal margin of profit. The 
Rational Expectation theory puts the accent on the capacity of the market to regulate 
itself and to settle the imbalances to get to an optimal equilibrium. So, any state 
intervention is not only harmful but also does not have the expected effect due to the 
prediction of economic institutions that would take measures to prevent negative 
effects. Finally, the New Neoclassical Political Economy approach assumes that state 
agencies are not different from private agencies in the sense that they are also 
following their personal interest and trying to maximize their profits. All kind of 
economic interventions follow this target. It would therefore be better to remove all 
those interventions through liberalizing and privatizing and minimizing the state role. 
 
To summarize, from the previous perspectives, we understand that any kind of state 
intervention in the economy is perceived as harmful, this means that for them, the 
economic approach to follow has to be “getting the prices right” including for food 
and energy, which entails removing general subsidies which bring price distortions 
and misallocations. The principle behind those theories and the SAESP is that 
building a better macroeconomic environment will encourage investment, which will 
bring growth, create jobs and increase salaries, which altogether will bring a poverty 
reduction. It could initiate a virtuous circle that would bring more growth and less 
poverty each round.  
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However, in the 1980's, such policies have lead to a failure of capital accumulation 
due to a decline in public expenditure and the rise of poverty due to the liberalization 
of food prices and subsequent decrease of the real wage of households. (Mohan et al, 
2000) Furthermore was it hardly criticized for its disastrous social repercussions. One 
of the most important and influential critiques came from UNICEF in its 1987 annual 
report entitled: “Adjustment with a human face”, which states that structural 
adjustment policies implemented in developing countries were harmful for the 
population. It criticizes the lack of consideration for the poor of the adjustment 
programs and denounces catastrophic repercussions on the population in most of the 
countries where such programs had been implemented. UNICEF’s campaign for an 
adjustment that would protect the vulnerable parts of society had a certain influence 
on the Bretton Woods Institutions, which slightly changed their policies thereafter. In 
a speech at the US Chamber of Congress in 1990, Michel Camdessus, managing 
director of the IMF, recognized that a “responsible adjustment program must take 
these effects into account, particularly as they impinge on the most vulnerable or 
disadvantaged groups of society”. (Stewart & FitzGerald, p.18) Ever since, the IMF 
has argued for cash transfers in order to compensate the food price increase for the 
most vulnerable people. It is nevertheless important to investigate the effect of 
consumer food subsidies on the free market. Particularly, the food subsidy programs 
that affect the market in three sectors: the agricultural sector, on inflation and on the 
foreign trade. The effect on the agricultural sector varies widely according to the type 
of food subsidy program implemented. Two main types of programs can be 
distinguished; the explicit and the implicit consumer food subsidies. In the explicit 
food subsidies, it is mainly the government that bears the cost of the program because 
it makes the budgetary outlays. On the other hand, implicit food subsidies are more 
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borne by the producers whose supply prices are held down. (Valdès, 1988) This was 
the kind of system that was implemented under Nasser where producers’ prices were 
artificially kept low. Explicit consumer food subsidies do not necessarily have adverse 
effects on agricultural incentives. Moreover, such subsidies can enhance the 
purchasing power of consumers who will then increase their demand for food and 
thus provide opportunities for increasing prices for producers. Regarding implicit 
consumer food subsidies, they might be harmful to producers who are usually 
constrained to maintain artificially low supply prices, which in turn result in a 
negative incentive for the production that entails less production and less farm 
income. (Pinstrup Andersen, 1988) As demonstrated previously, this has been the case 
in Egypt under Nasser’s rule when farmers had to deliver part or all of their 
production at low price which had the consequence of slow growth of wheat 
production.  In the late 1970's, however, the burden of financing low food prices for 
consumers was gradually shifted from farmers to the government. (Pinstrup Andersen, 
1988) Yet, Pinstrup Andersen (1988) specifies that negative effects may occur also 
with explicit types of subsidies if the part of the budget that the government spends 
those subsidies on would have been spent on public investment in agricultural 
infrastructure, technology development or research instead. A study of Egyptian food 
subsidies conducted by Scobie (1988) found, that while gross fiscal support to the 
agricultural sector rose with increasing fiscal costs of food subsidies during the late 
1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the share of public investment in agriculture was 
reduced. It can, however, not be identified whether the reduction was caused by an 
increasing part of the budget spent on food subsidies. Scobie did not investigate the 
eventual stimulation to increase productivity resulting from a higher demand in the 
case of explicit subsidies. In case the demand is raised, with prices kept at the same 
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level, this could indeed push the producer to innovate and invest in order to respond to 
a higher demand. Furthermore, the recent policy of the GoE to raise wheat 
productivity contradicts Scobie's assumption. Factually, it is not in the interest of the 
government, which has to supply subsidized food items, to reduce investment for 
production because this might create more dependency on imports and international 
price fluctuation. It is not clear whether and to what extent food subsidies have an 
influence on the inflation rate. However, Prinstrup Andersen (1988) has a hypothesis - 
specifying that it does not always work in this way - that if the changes in subsidy 
cost are reflected in similar changes in government deficit spending, this deficit 
spending might be financed through increased money supply and in this case the 
subsidies might cause inflation. Thus, while the prices of the subsidized goods are 
kept low, the prices of other goods will increase and the net benefits derived by 
consumers might be lower than the value of the transfer. This causal-effect relation is 
often overlooked in the literature and the debate regarding food subsidies. Indeed, 
governments often justify subsidies as a measure to control food-price inflation by 
keeping food prices low. Empirical evidence of the inflationary effects of food 
subsidies is, however, insufficient. Results from Egypt and Korea indicate that the 
effect can be large; it was found that a 10 percent increase in food subsidies in Egypt 
would result in a 5 percent increase in the rate of inflation. (Prinstrup Anderson, 1988) 
Andersen is thus not so clear on this particular aspect; there seems to be a lack of 
evidence to develop a clear stand on the influence of subsidies on inflation rates. The 
FAO (Website) also highlights that food subsidies ’distort’ the consumption habits of 
a population. Subsidies on food items can lead to an increase in the consumption of 
particular food items that cannot always be produced domestically. Thereof resulting 
imports might expand consumption patterns, which could then shift away from the 
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local staple and disturbs the balance of payments. Furthermore would this be reflected 
in the availability of foreign exchange for other imports. It has been estimated that a 
10 percent increase in imported food in Egypt would lead to a 1 or 2 percent fall in 
industrial production due to a decrease of raw material imports that provides the 
needed amount of foreign exchange for food imports. (Scobie, 1988) Implicit 
subsidies involve even greater consequences on foreign trade as, in addition to the 
increased demand, they usually reduce domestic supply, thus reducing self-
sufficiency. This implies decreasing exports and increasing imports, which raise the 
demand for foreign exchange and thus enhance the pressure on the exchange rate. 
(Prinstrup Andersen, 1988) Implicit subsidies are therefore known to negatively affect 
domestic production. While there is no evidence on the exact repercussion of explicit 
subsidies on production, it can be inferred that they have a rather good influence on 
domestic production.    
 
4.2. Food subsidy policies in Egypt 
4.2.1. Poverty and need for subsidies 
Egypt's poverty rates increased from 19.6 percent of the population in 2004/2005 to 
25.2 percent in 2010/2011 (IFPRI et al., 2013). This resulted in an increase in the 
prevalence of food insecurity of 17.2 percent, which equals 13.7 million people 
suffering from food insecurity in 2011, from 14 percent of the population in 2009 
(WFP & CAPMAS, 2003). In the last decade, the country suffered from a succession 
of crises including the avian flu epidemic in 2006, the food, fuel and financial crisis in 
2007-2009 and the difficult macroeconomic situation following the revolution of 
2011. Those factors pushed twice as many people into food insecurity than those 
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moving out of it in 2011 (IFPRI et al., 2013). The rural Upper Egypt is particularly 
affected by poverty, with the poverty rate being as high as 51.5 percent (Adams and 
al., 2010). Also, chronic child malnutrition has also been rising in the past decade. By 
2008, about one third of Egyptian children under the age of five were stunted, this rate 
is considered “high” according to the standards of the WHO. (IFPRI et al., 2013) This 
is mostly critical given that child malnutrition, particularly in the first 1000 days of 
life, irreversibly affects brain/cognitive development, productivity and health through 
adulthood. (Save the Children, 2012) 
In Egypt, food insecurity is rather an issue of access to food than availibility of food. 
Thus, there is a strong correlation between poverty and poor access to food. This 
makes food subsidies a crucial issue in a country with such a high rate of poverty.  
The government of Egypt is improving access to food for its population by its food 
subsidy program. Despite their shortcomings, subsidies are still highly needed by the 
population. They play an important role in protecting the poor against high food 
prices. Also, it has been estimated that a removal of the food subsidies would increase 
the poverty rate from 25.2 percent to about 34 percent. (Adams et al., 2010) In 
addition to their role as a contribution to food intake in households, the most 
important immediate benefit of food subsidies is the positive effect on real incomes of 
households. The income transfers occur through lower food prices. Food subsidies 
account for a significant portion of poor households’ net incomes. In fact, the poor 
spend a great part of their household budget on food; which means that a change in 
the price of food commodities has a bigger impact on their purchasing power than it 
has for middle and upper class households. Thus, a reduction of 10 percent in food 
prices should result in an increase of 6 to 8 percent in the real income of the poorest 
decile of the population, while on the other hand, the real income increase would only 
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be 1 to 3 percent for the richest decile. Also, in several of the programs analyzed, the 
value of the food subsidies received by low-income households account for 15 to 25 
percent of their net incomes. (Pinstrup Andersen, 1988) 
 
4.2.2. Need for reform 
The literature on food subsidies in Egypt agrees on the necessity for reform of the 
Egyptian food subsidy system. The World Bank (2010) published a report that 
includes an overview on the issue and provides a wide analysis of the current food 
subsidy system’s shortcomings. It emphasizes that the system suffers from significant 
leakages and that it is not targeted enough. A focus on those two deficiencies could 
allow the government to reduce its high expenditure in food subsidies significantly.  
In the fiscal year of 2008/2009 the cost of food subsidies reached LE 21.1 billion, a 
figure that equals 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). However, these 
costs include the above-mentioned leakages, which the World Bank estimated to be of 
around LE 5.5 billion at a national level, which represents 28 percent of total food 
subsidies. The losses for baladi bread and baladi wheat flour subsidies - which 
represent two thirds of all subsidies - were estimated at LE 3.7 billion which is 
equivalent to 31 percent of the cost of those subsidies.  
The Egyptian program of food subsidies reaches almost the whole population. 
Subsidized baladi bread is distributed through bakeries, which are open to everyone. 
In 2008/09, 81 percent of Egyptian households were purchasing baladi bread, a figure 
that does not vary very much according to expenditure groups: the share of 
households that purchase subsidized bread in the poorest quintile - 78 percent – is 
lower than in the tree middle quintiles and is almost equivalent to the share of the 
richest quintile - 77.7 percent. Also, for the three middle quintiles this share is lower 
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for the 2nd quintile than for the two richer ones - 81 percent, 83.8 percent and 84.9 
percent accordingly. Similarly, 67.6 percent of Egyptian households held a ration card 
in 2008/2009. In the case of ration cards, however, the share of the population holding 
it regresses from the poorest to the richest quintile – 76 percent and 57 percent 
respectively. Yet, according to the World Bank, (2010, p.20) “while 38 percent of the 
poorest two quintiles do not benefit from ration cards, two-third of the richest quintile 
have a ration card”. 
 
Table 2: Share of households holding Ration Cards  
Source: World Bank 2010 
 
The World Bank (2010) calculated that by reducing the overall leakages to 10 percent 
and by excluding the richest 40 percent of the population from receiving subsidies, 
Table 1: Share of households purchasing subsidized baladi bread 
Source: World Bank 2010  
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LE9.5 billion or 48.6 percent of the food subsidies could be saved, while with 
excluding the richest 60 percent, 12.3 billion or 62.8 percent of food subsidies could 
be saved. Part of it could then be redistributed to the poorest quintiles. The exclusion 
of people who consider themselves as entitled to subsidies, however, might jeopardize 
the whole system. It could be interesting to investigate to which extent subsidies 
would lose their legitimacy or popular support if they did not benefit of the entire 
population anymore.  
 
4.3. International agencies' role 
4.3.1. International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a dark past with social policies. Their 
structural adjustments policies imposed on all too many developing countries in the 
1980's, as a way to control the growing budgetary imbalance and stagnation, had 
catastrophic repercussions on the most vulnerable parts of those countries’ population. 
Most of the adjustment programs followed the idea of the trickle-down effect, a model 
that holds that the money of the wealthy benefit poorer members of society merely by 
improving the economy as a whole. In congruence with this way of thinking, no effort 
was made to prevent the further deterioration of the situation of the vulnerable in the 
short run. (Cornia et. al. 1987)   
In Egypt, as in number of other countries like Nigeria Morocco and Peru, food 
subsidy reductions were introduced without paying attention to the structural 
disjunction it would create, and eventually led to civilians rioting and threatening 
government stability. (Muralidharan, 1991) Although the IMF does not officially 
oppose food subsidies, it still holds the opinion that subsidies are not suitable for the 
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free market because its redistributive mechanisms distort the good functioning of 
"perfect competition between free economic agents". (Muralidharan, 1991) The IMF 
and its Bretton Woods partner the World Bank are in favor of highly targeted 
subsidies only if they are really indispensable. This means that subsides should only 
reach the most needy and exclude the ones that can bear the market price of the 
product. (Muralidharan,1991) 
The IMF for example, insisted on cutting subsidies in West and Central African 
countries; claiming that subsidies were not effective in directly helping the poor and, 
besides that, only really foster smuggling and corruption (Ahmed, 2011). 
Furthermore, IMF estimates show that overall food and fuel subsidies accounted for 
more than 8 percent of the GDP in Egypt and Jordan in 2011. They state that 
generalized price subsidies in the MENA region are not very effective in helping the 
poor because they only make out a relatively small portion of the overall spending on 
subsidies. According to Nemat Shafik, IMF Deputy Managing Director, “it’s a myth 
that generalized energy subsidies could help the poor as only 20 percent of those 
subsidies reach the poor while the remaining 80 percent benefit the non-needy,” (IMF 
Survey online, 2012) They defend the need to replace “wasteful price subsidy 
regimes” that do not fulfill their mission since they benefit mainly the wealthy, with 
better-targeted social safety nets that protect the poor and are more cost effective. The 
money saved with this change could then be invested in infrastructure, education, and 
health, which would benefit the population as a whole. 
The IMF estimates indicate that cash transfer systems could result in about 50–75 
percent of spending reaching the bottom 40 percent of the population, which would be 
far more effective than the actual 20 percent of the amount spent on subsidized fuel 
and 35 percent to subsidize food items. (IMF Survey online, 2012)  
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Since its self-defined mission is to “reduce poverty and support development” (World 
Bank website), the World Bank is more focused on poverty reduction and 
development. However it has an ideology similar to the IMF; the World Bank used to 
require adjustment program as a condition for its loans. In 1999, after the controversy 
about the effect such programs have on poverty, it changed its loan process by giving 
more autonomy to the government and a greater say to civil society on their anti-
poverty strategies. In the same year, the Bank launched its Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF), which stressed “the importance of non-economic 
development such as nutrition, health and education status”. (Deacon, 2007, p.29) As 
seen before, the World Bank (2010) is in favor of reforms aiming at better targeting 
food subsidies to reach the poor and reduce the leakages that could both bring 
significant savings in the system’s expenditures. It does, however, not advocate for a 
total abolition of food subsidies. It recognizes their importance as a factor of poverty 
reduction and mitigation, especially the baladi bread which is primordial in the 
Egyptians’ diet. It also emphasizes on the good aspect of food subsidies being the 
government’s ability to purchase those goods at a lower price than in the free market, 
which means that the consumer’s benefit is higher than the government’s subsidy 
cost. This point is however disputable because the system suffers from leakages and 
weak targeting. Finally, they argue that subsidies are seen as “part of compensation 
mechanism for low level salaries and wages” and as the ‘most concrete benefits [they] 
receive from government spending. (World Bank, 2010, p.37) In the light of Deacon 
(2007) it can be said that this reflects aptly on the Bank’s tendency to advocate for a 
governmental social expenditure targeting the poor and only the poor.  
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4.3.2. UNICEF's adjustment with a human face 
In its annual report of 1987, UNICEF criticized the fact that structural adjustment 
policies implemented in developing countries "did not make explicit effort to prevent 
the worsening of child well-being and often contributed to a rise in the number of 
people in poverty". (UNICEF,1986-1987, p.6) It stated that to advocate for 
“Adjustment with a human face” an adjustment would need to protect the vulnerable. 
Concerning the food policy, the report points out that increasing food prices, while 
households’ incomes are diminishing, will create an aggravated nutritional status of 
children in the poorest families. It further criticizes the consequences of structural 
adjustments on nutrition; "There is now evidence that malnutrition increased and 
educational attainment deteriorated in the 1980s in at least 16 countries in Africa 
south of the Sahara, eight in Latin America, and three in North Africa and the Middle 
East." (UNICEF,1986-1987, p.6) In a book that develops the concept of “Adjustment 
with a human face” further (Cornia et. al. 1987), it is mentioned that nutrition 
interventions, such as targeted food subsidies, are essential in a country where the 
rates of malnutrition are high and they function as compensation measures when 
macro adjustment is likely to generate an increase in food prices. They however 
strongly recommend targeted subsidy programs. UNICEF does not only support food 
subsidies in theory, they also work on some subsidy projects on the ground. This is 
the casein Mozambique, for example, where they are now working with the 
government to expand the national food subsidy program in order to include all poor 
and vulnerable children.  They are specifically working on the extension of the 
program to children who are responsible for raising other children which were not 
included before. (Bloemen, 2011)  
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4.3.3. The World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization  
Both the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) are mainly working in collaboration with the governments and which cannot 
work without the agreement of the government of the country they are based in. 
Contrarily to the IMF or the World Bank, they do not have financial means of 
pressure. In addition to a normative function, in the case of the FAO, these 
organizations provide policy advice and technical cooperation to governments. For 
the FAO, general food subsidies allow a quick response to improve access to food and 
reduce the impact of price increases. However, general subsidies are really costly and 
are most of the time difficult to remove or scale down because it can imply important 
political cost. FAO would be rather in favor of "self-targeted" food subsidies, which 
are subsidies on products that are inferior. The principle of self-targeted food 
subsidies is to subsidize goods that are considered of “lower quality”, these are goods 
that people would prefer not to consume if they could afford other items. A successful 
example of such a program was the distribution of yellow maize - which is a lower 
quality good - in Kenya in 1985 during the drought. It means that the ones that can 
afford it would still prefer to purchase white maize, which is a higher quality good. 
(FAO, 2010) The preference for targeted subsidy programs is shared by the WFP. 
They would, however, rather advocate for targeting by identifying the neediest users 
through methods such as geographic targeting and proxy means testing.4 They are in 
favor of a ration card with clear criteria and a regularly updated database of users. 
(IFRI et al., 2013) Both organizations also emphasize that good safety nets in place - 
                                                
4 Proxy means tests are survey conducted in order to determinate whether an individual or household 
is entitled to receive a help from the government based on its need for this help according to a list of 
specific criteria, like if they have a TV or how many people sleep in the same room.  
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like an efficient cash transfer program for the needy - can help the nutritious status of 
the poor and can even help avoid using subsidies, in case of price increases, the 
government can scale up those measures. But in many developing countries, the 
safety nets are really weak or non-existent. The number of short-term policy options 
to protect the vulnerable is then limited.  (IFPRI et al.,2013; FAO, 2010)  
 
 
5. Data Collection (Interviews) 
5.1. International agencies 
The World Food Programme is an agency fighting hunger in the world. They also 
care about the nutritional status of the people and food security in a longer term. 
(WFP Website) In Egypt, it is therefore the main organization dealing with the issue 
of food subsidy reforms as a part of their agenda for the food security of the 
households and nutritional status of the population.  
In order to obtain more information about their position on subsidy policy, I could 
interview Noura Abdel Wahab who is an economist working as program officer at the 
World Food Programme country office in Egypt. The following part comes therefore 
mainly from the interview with Noura Abdel Wahab. 	  
According to her, food subsidies play mainly a role of income transfer and 
compensation that have protected the livelihood of the poor, especially during food 
prices shocks. This system has managed to provide a minimal caloric income per day 
to the population. WFP, however, also highlights a negative effect of this program 
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which allegedly generates an obesity problem because of its composition (IFPRI et 
al.).  
WFP Egypt has a memorandum of understanding and good relations with Ministry of 
Supply and Internal Trade5 since 2005. The Programme has been supporting them in 
the food subsidy reform. In 2008, under the government of the deposed President 
Hosni Mubarak, there were already some talks for reforms but the food rising 
international food prices during this year made it impossible to pursue a reform of the 
food subsidies at this time. There was, however, several attempts to enhance the 
efficiency of the system and the WFP was in close relation with the Ministry in these 
efforts. WFP has been approached by the government to conduct a vulnerability 
report according to the criteria of WFP.  They have done this vulnerability study in 
2005, which touches the issue of food subsidies and access to food and gave some 
recommendations which were taken forward by the Ministry like the separation of 
production and distribution in the supply chain of baladi bread to reduce leakages. 
Additionally, they did a supply chain study review for the baladi bread in 2009-2010 
and they also worked on simplification of the chain.  In the beginning of 2013, the 
Ministry has started to reform the baladi bread supply chain. As seen previously, now 
the bakers have to buy the flour at the market price from the state mills while before 
the General Agency for Supplied Commodities (GASC) was procuring them the flour 
from domestic and international production at a subsidized price. Now the GASC 
establishes a market price for the wheat flour and bakeries have to buy it at this price. 
Then, they sell it at a subsidized price and the Ministry compensates them for the 
                                                
5  The Ministry in charge with food subsidies was reshuffled and renamed several times in the 
last few years. The Ministry of Solidarity and Social Justice was created in 2011 after the revolution. 
Then from December 2011, it became the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade.  
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difference. This system is reducing the temptation from the baker to sell in the black 
market the wheat that they used to get at the subsidized price of 60 EGP per bag of 
50kg while the market price was 500 EGP.  This is a first strategy to reduce leakages. 
The second strategy used is to mix flour with corn flour which cannot be used for 
baking other goods than baladi bread. The bakers are however not satisfied and accuse 
the Ministry not to compensate them enough for the high price of transportation. They 
are asking for 120 EGP while they receive only 80EGP. A study conducted by WFP 
and CAPMAS found however that their actual cost would be only 65 EGP. The 
reason of their anger might well be the loss of benefits - obtained through selling flour 
to the black market - generated by the reform. The Ministry has, however, adopted 
only part of the recommendations given by WFP. The agency advised that the role of 
GASC which procures all the wheat should be more challenged by private actors; if 
the subsidies are moved to the bakeries, they should let the free market operate and 
GASC should keep a strategic stock only to play a role of price regulator. This shows 
the influence brought by the WFP but illustrates also that the decision of whether and 
how to apply those recommendations remain fully in the hand of the Ministry of 
Supply. 
 
Concerning the rationed subsidized items, a new system of smart card replacing the 
paper ration card has been introduced to 20 % of the ration card holders and it is 
aimed to replace completely the paper ration card. Using this numeric card that can 
contain more information about its user that a paper one, was also part of the WFP 
recommendations in 2005. WFP is in favor of the smart card rationing the food 
subsidies which is an efficient system for the Egyptian situation, the program needs, 
however, to be better targeted in order to include a bigger part of the poor and exclude 
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the non-needy. The composition of the subsidized food basket also has to be changed 
to improve its nutritional quality - adding for instance beans and lentils and removing 
tea. (World Food Programme, 2010)  While agreeing both on the need for targeting, 
the Ministry has set criteria and questions to evaluate them that do not convince the 
World Food Programme which judges them not sufficient.   
 
In contrast with the World Bank, the World Food Programme does not want to 
advance number of how many people should be excluded; they prefer to leave this 
decision to the Ministry. This reveals well the worry of not exerting a too strong 
influence on the Ministry or to push for certain policies, the WFP wants to keep 
mainly a role of adviser and does not want to be involved in decision making which 
are politically sensitive. They play rather a role of support, capacity building and they 
do not put themselves in the front line. They consider themselves as partner only. 
Based on the vulnerability research conducted by WFP and its partners, Abdel Wahab 
estimates however that about 40 percent of the populations need full subsidies and the 
next 20 percent need a partial ration.  
 
While financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF advocate for cash 
transfers, WFP is not in favor of this option, they are attached to more the stable in-
kind subsidies because of the inflations rates.  Cash transfers could replace in-kind 
only if there would be a mechanism to compensate the price changes, which is 
complicated because prices might even be different from one region to the other. 
While highlighting the need to improve the system, in a report prepared for the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity (World Food Programme, 2010) WFP states that “the 
replacement of the in-kind subsidy of baladi bread and Ration Card commodities to a 
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cash subsidy is not an appropriate choice if the objective of the GoE is to guarantee 
the basic needs for poor and low-income groups in Egypt, in light of the inflation rate, 
the global economic fluctuations, and the inability of the cash subsidy to be adjusted 
annually according to price increases.” And to add that “a staggering 98 percent of 
surveyed households prefer the current Ration Card system and would rather keep it 
than replace it with a cash system. Only 2 percent of the respondents preferred 
receiving cash instead of the commodities offered by the Ration Card”.  WFP 
advocates for in-kind subsidies but with variety between the regions because the 
preferences differ from one region to the other. The food vouchers would also be a 
good solution; with the vouchers system, the Ministry is not the one procuring the 
food, the people simply go to buy from the supermarket which is then compensated 
by the state, while with the ration card, the Ministry of Supply is procuring the 
subsidized food to tamwin shops which are distributing the subsidized items.  
 
The relations with the Ministry suffered from repeated changes of cabinet, making it 
difficult to deliver and have a good communication. This pattern affects the extent to 
which WFP can have an influence on the policy. Although a largely good relation, a 
mutual trust relationship and mutual knowledge need to be built and this is 
compromised when the Ministry is not stable. 
 
When asked what is the main source of pressure for the government, Mrs Abdel 
Wahab identifies in a first place the IMF loan which puts them under pressure for 
reform. She thinks that although it is less primordial than energy subsidies since it 
costs less, the food subsidy system is also on the negotiation table and that even if 
food subsidies are not a specific requirement in the talks, they have to be reformed 
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because of the fiscal deficit. However, reforming the subsidies now is sensitive 
because of the political situation. Fuel and food subsidies are a very sensitive issue to 
the people so the actors in the power are very reluctant to reform it in the current 
period because they fear to loose popularity and therefore loose votes for the 
upcoming parliamentary elections.  
 
5.2. Ministry level 
In order to understand how the decisions are made at the governmental level, I 
decided to conduct interview with officials working at this level. I had the honor to 
interview Dr. Gouda Abdel-Khalek who is currently a Professor of Economics in the 
Faculty of Economics, Cairo University. He served as Minister of Solidarity and 
Social Justice from February 2011 to August 2012. He could therefore give me some 
precious information and share his opinion on the subject.  
 
First, when talking about reform, there is an issue of social contract; do the people 
want bread available at a subsidized price for everybody in Egypt, for the Egyptian 
citizens or to some Egyptians? For him this is a question that has to be rethought. 
However in the immediate time what is possible is at least to reduce the leakages.  
 
The need for food subsidies is the consequence of poverty. So the policy key is not to 
focus only on subsidies but to have a national program to eradicate poverty, however, 
Egypt is still adopting policies which create poverty. The example of Brazil is often 
cited but in this case, a whole social program has been implemented. Then, Dr. Abdel 
Khalek emphasizes the importance of focusing not only on the demand side but also 
on the supply side. Thus, a program was launched last year to increase the country's 
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capacity to produce food. Since the subsidies are also the result of poverty in the 
country and two third of the poor are located in rural area, two birds could be killed 
with one stone by giving the farmers incentive to grow wheat. The Minister of 
Agriculture provided the farmers with high yielding variety wheat seeds which indeed 
resulted with a very good harvest in 2013; According to the FAO website, the 
government is expecting a harvest of 9.5 million tons of wheat for 2013 while the 8.8 
million tons of 2012 were exceeding the level of 2011 by 5 percent.  
 
The former Minister approves the current reform in the baladi bread supply chain 
which was started under his mandate. However, similarly to the WFP, he thinks that 
they do not go far enough. The way bread supply chain is working now is the 
following; the General Agency for Supply Commodities (GASC) procures the wheat 
from the local and international market and sells it to the mills at the national price - 
which is generally below the international prices - . While before, the government was 
providing the wheat at subsidized price in a way that the difference between the 
market price and the subsidized price was so big that it was giving incentives to 
bakers to sell the wheat on the black market. Now, mills buy the wheat at the market 
price (2500-2800 EGP), they turn it to flour and sell it at the market price - wheat plus 
their own profit - to bakers. The bakers bake the loaves and sell them at the subsidized 
price of 5 Piasters and then receive back the production cost plus benefit from the 
government. The problem in the current system is that the bakers lack liquidity and 
margin because they have to afford themselves the cost of subsidies until they get the 
money back from the Ministry.  Dr. Abdel Khalek's opinion is that it would have been 
better if everybody operates at the market price and then the government buys the 
bread at the market price and distributes it at the subsidized price. With the new 
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system, GASC should change its mandate and role and instead of being an agency 
which buys wheat from national market or international market and gives it to the 
meals at a national price, it could play a role of a gatekeeper for the country’s 
strategic reserves. Its role would be simply to stabilize the market of grain through its 
strategic grain reserves which would allow it to intervene in the market prices by 
injecting wheat on the market when its price is high.  
 
Concerning the reform of the ration card system, until now few has been done. The 
only improvement is a change in the administrative procedure; before, every single 
application for the ration card used to have to be approved by the Minister himself.  
After the revolution this responsibility has been transferred to the directors of supply 
of each of the 27 governorates.  
There is an important need for reviewing all the ration card holders in the system in 
order to actualize it. Indeed, some people use to fulfill the requirement to obtain the 
smart card and do not anymore because their situation improved. Similarly, on the 
ration cards for the households there are many users who passed away but who are 
still registered. The Ministry estimated that no less than one fourth of the ration card 
holders are not qualified for it anymore. However, this is a huge work and Abdel 
Khalek said they did not have the time or the energy to make this under his mandate. 
They preferred to focus in a first place on making sure that nobody is taking 
advantage of the system and on preventing leakage.  
In Egypt, the subsidized items on the ration card are rice, sugar, oil and tea. To 
procure these commodities the Ministry of Supply puts public tenders and traders 
provide those commodities. For example, in the case of rice, Egypt produces more 
than its need of rice and an export ban of rice was introduced to make it available for 
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the Egyptians. When it comes to subsidized rice, every month GASC announces a 
public invitation to tender for traders to supply hundred thousand tons of rice and they 
take the offer with the lowest price. But the problem was that there was a monopoly 
of rice traders who formed a cartel to keep the prices high. The traders were buying 
rice at the beginning of the season at about 1800 EGP per ton from the farmers. Then, 
they would raise the price every month when supplying to GASC and at the end of the 
year in July the price hit 4000EGP. What was done was to switch from monthly, to 
four times a year procurements. In addition, the strategy was to have a strategic 
reserve of rice which could be used to influence the market because GASC needs to 
supply rice to ration card holders and if it does not have reserve it depends completely 
on the price set by the traders. Consequently, if the traders are using a price which is 
excessively high, GASC can use its own reserves instead of buying it to them. This 
serves therefore as a mean of pressure against high prices. This “game” is, however, 
very sensitive because, it requires fighting against the food providers but on the other 
side, there is the necessity to get the food because the ration card holders need food.  
 
It can be therefore observed that working on subsidy policies requires experience 
learning. Abdel Khalek highlights also the importance of talking to the people. For 
example, when they started the new policies with wheat, in the summer 2011, he 
toured in seven governorates talking to the people working for the supply chain. 
Advocacy is really important and collaboration is needed to reach a success.  
 
Regarding international organizations, the IMF surely is a big player in this area. 
Abdel Khalek deplores that evidences found in documents on the food issue produced 
by institution like IFPRI - which he consider as useful and interesting- are sometimes 
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used by the IMF to serve its own agenda, mainly to support the statement that food 
subsidy is bad and is the source of many economic ills in addition to inefficiency. 
Indeed, without supporting the point of view of the IMF specialized institutes point 
out the weaknesses of food subsidy programs and their need for reform. Those 
information can then be misuses by the IMF to support its own argument on the 
inefficiency of this type of social program. Of course, nobody can deny that the food 
subsidy system in Egypt is far from being perfect, but on the other hand it is still 
necessary since Egypt has a big problem of poverty.  
The IMF is pushing for liberalization of trade but Adel Khalek argues that if Egypt 
liberalizes its trade completely with the rest of the world, it would not be able to face 
the competition of the agricultural goods coming from the north which are heavily 
subsidized. This would have a huge negative impact on the Egyptian farmers and 
would therefore raise poverty. Then, IMF seriously opposes progressive income taxes, 
however, they went heavily in favor of sales taxes and indirect taxes which are very 
regressive kind of taxes because its burden falls relatively more heavily on the poor 
people so this is not social at all.  
The economist blames therefore the IMF for advocating for antisocial reforms which 
would worsen the situations of the poor in Egypt. They suggest other types of reform 
that would comply with the revolution's demand for social justice - for instance 
putting a tax on the stock exchange transactions which is a sector generating a lot of 
money but that is completely unproductive - .  
 
With regards to the loan, IMF pretends not to have conditions but at the end of the day 
the government will have to submit a letter of intent which has to be acceptable for 
the Fund. The IMF talks officially mainly about reforming the energy subsidies. 
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However, delegations coming to Cairo were always advocating for a move from in-
kind subsidies to cash transfers which would be less costly and that would be also the 
occasion to exclude more people from subsidies, while those people might need it. 
The former Minister thinks moving toward cash subsidies which are more efficient, is 
a good solution for the future but with its situation of mass poverty, Egypt is not ready 
yet for that. It can be noted here that Abdel Khalek agrees on the finality of the 
solution of cash transfers, however, he does not agree on the way to reach it; for him, 
even if that would be the most efficient solution it cannot be implemented in the 
current socio-economic situation, this could be implemented only after having 
addressed the problem of poverty in Egypt as a whole.  
Until now, no agreement can be reached since the IMF wants to sign a deal with a 
government with a solid and broad popular base to ensure the feasibility of its 
application. On the other hand, the IMF also does not find that enough has been done 
till now to reduce the amount of subsidies and to reduce the fiscal deficit.  
 
5.3. Experts 
Dr. Hania Sholkamy is an anthropologist who is currently associate professor at the 
Social Research Center of the AUC. She conducted many researches on food 
subsidies in Egypt and participated to a pilot program of conditional6 cash transfer 
and has been working on issue of subsidies reform as a technical advisor to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. The program of conditional cash transfers that the Social 
Research Center was developing in cooperation with the Ministry was stopped in July 
                                                
6 Conditional cash transfers contrast with unconditional cash transfers. The first are delivered only if 
the recipients respect some defined pre-conditions, like sending their children to school.  In 
opposition, the second does not require any other condition from entitled recipients.  
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2012. This program was supported by UNDP which would provide technical 
assistance like supporting the Social Research Center's cooperation with the Ministry. 
The program itself was, however, financed by the GoE. It aimed to provide cash 
transfers to the woman in the family who can prove that their children attend 85 
percent of the school time.  
 
For Sholkamy, there is a problem at the decision making level because there is a 
fragmentation between the different levels, there is not a strong integrated cabinet that 
takes decision and implements them. There is no coordination and long term planning 
and monitoring. This has always been the case but it is worse since the revolution.  
It is difficult to know which direction the Ministry of Supply want to take because the 
government has been changed several times since the revolution of 2011. This implies 
also that the Minister which takes the lead has each time to get familiar with the issue. 
For example, the Minister Bassem Ouda, in position under Morsi's presidency was in 
favor of moving to cash transfers but had no clue of what had been done before. He 
had also political pressure since he was close to the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
in power who had committed to rationalize the economy.  On the other hand, the party 
needed to keep its popularity, this is probably why they opened new registrations for 
the ration card, even if this doesn't mean people are going to get it.   
The international pressure plays also a role of course, but this is not the main point 
because it is clear that, as seen previously, the system is not efficient because it is too 
costly and it fails to fulfill sufficiently its social role.    
 
She sees conditional cash transfer as an additional social program for the ultra-poor 
for which food subsidies are not enough. In the case where in-kind subsidies would be 
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removed, the cash transfers could be one of the compensation but this would not be 
enough.  An experimental program of conditional cash transfers had already 
successfully been implemented in some villages in different regions of Egypt.  
 
According to Sholkamy, statistics are not a problem for a better implementation of the 
food subsidies, there is the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) which 
gives a proxy of who is poor and who is not, there is information but the problem 
remains to decide who is poor. The Ministry of Supply in 2008-2009 did a registration 
for the ration card which has 13 million families on it. This means that the problem is 
not the data but the difficulty of setting a fair poverty line that satisfies everybody.  
She also thinks that proxy means testing (which are usually used by the World Bank) 
is no suitable for Egypt, because you need a self-registration mechanism and then an 
appeal mechanism so that if you do not agree with a decision you have a chance to 
appeal and have your case re-examined.  
It would facilitate a lot the process to have universal targeting categories like for 
instance, all kids below the age of five living in poor area or all person above the age 
of 65 should have a cash transfer. To secure the livelihood of the people, more than 
one approach and those approaches are needed and they have to to be simple and 
transparent.  
The way used until now by the Ministry of Social Affairs for the social assistance is 
that people have to prove that they are poor which is almost impossible. It results that 
for example, in Upper Egypt 75 percent of the households have not access to any kind 
of social assistance while in this area, over 50 per cent are poor. This shows that 
social assistance is not sufficient in Egypt and gives justification to the importance of 
in-kind food subsidies as an additional livelihood protection.  
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Regarding the baladi bread, in the new system the leakages of wheat and flour are 
reduced, but instead the leakages are in the bread since the baker do not sell all the 
loaves at 5 piasters but keeps some of them to sell them at a higher price. This is 
already a little bit better because this system at least succeed in producing more bread. 
Any system based on control and punishment is not going to work, they need to raise 
awareness.  
  
There is a big pressure on the decision maker in the post 25th January environment. 
There are too many people on the ration card; about 60 million but what they get is 
actually not much. Indeed, in 2009 the government extended the number of people 
eligible for the ration card but reduced the subsidized quantities. The program is 
valuable to people but it is not a good program in term of the way it is implemented 
and in term of the composition of the food basket that is subsidized.  
 
The most pressuring aspect for reforms is the fiscal deficit. This creates also a 
pressure from the IMF but also of all other donors and investors who need a minimum 
of guarantees. The only difference between the IMF today and the IMF twenty years 
ago is that today they look at the outcomes, they do not tell the countries how to get it, 
but at the end the budget deficit needs to be reduced. At the national level, it has 
always been depending on the political ramifications. The subsidy regime is very 
important because any failure can upset the people very much and generate unrests. 
According to Sholkamy, there was a good political opportunity to reform subsidies 
just after the revolution that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCARF) 
missed. After the revolution, for example, there was a general good will from the 
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international community, they could have contracted loans with the IMF with low 
interest rates and apparently soft conditionality. At the population level, reforms 
would also have been more acceptable at this time. Internationally and locally, there 
was more good will and support at this time.  
Another important element to take into account is legitimacy; it is very difficult for a 
government to engage sensitive reforms without enough legitimacy. Mubarak did not 
have enough popular support, and then came the army with a certain legitimacy which 
vanished quite quickly, finally the Muslim Brotherhood, although they had a 
democratic legitimacy proved to be more willing to control the country than to govern 
it and this made them loose also a lot of credibility toward the population.  
 
The WFP had a wonderful influence in enabling the government to move to a 
different production circle and estimate the waste. IFPRI in 2007 did a study about the 
ration card and its utilization. The government knows everything about the system 
from a fiscal aspect but has very poor information on the social, nutritional or 
economic features. The donor agencies like the WFP are thus very effective and 
useful in compensating this weakness.  Around the year 2005, the government began 
to be interested about the previous aspects only because of the need to rationalize the 
budget. The donors played an important role in enabling the government to learn more 
about the incidences of their own practices.  
 
Regarding the negotiation with the IMF, Sholkamy confirmed that the IMF is 
suggesting an unconditional cash program financed by the World Bank. She 
emphasize that the obstacle to a deal for the IMF loan is not only on subsidies but also 
on many other issues like taxes, the political situation, etc.   
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6. Analysis of the material  
6.1. Stakeholder analysis of food subsidy policy reform 
The Stakeholder analysis allows a better understanding of the relations between the 
different stakeholders involved in food subsidy reform.  
 
• Primary stakeholders are the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Finance, the 
WFP and the IMF. 
• The ministries have weak relations and coordination between each other. 
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• The UN agencies have a strong coordination of their activities. 
• The IMF and the World Bank have strong relations with the Ministry of 
Finance, however their relations with the Ministry of Supply are rater 
conflicting.  
•  The independent research centers are providing information to the 
stakeholders. 
• The Ministry of Supply has close ties with the World Food Programme. 
 
6.2. Factors affecting the Egyptian government                  
Here it is important to distinguish external and internal factors that affect government 
decisions on the issue of food subsidies. At an internal level, the government faces 
many pressures that sometimes contradict each other. First, there is a need to cut the 
expenditure in order to balance the budget deficit because the economic situation is 
not sustainable. Food and fuel subsidies alone account for more than 25 percent of the 
state’s expenditure7. (Korayem, 2013; Galal, 2013) Beside this, the state expenditure 
goes mainly on debt services, public wages and salaries and the remaining budget 
goes for diverse kind of public expenditure; including health, education and 
investment. Costly and inefficient subsidy program can naturally be seen as suitable 
field for cuts and for reforms. On the other hand, while necessary, those reforms are 
very sensitive because they will necessarily affect a population that might react to the 
loss of services. When it comes to food subsidies, it is particularly sensitive because it 
touches on two of the three demands of the revolution: bread and social justice. The 
                                                
7 Expenditure for subsidies are included under the chapter “Subsidy, Grants, Social Benefits” which 
account for about 30 percent of the State’s Public Budget. (Ministry of Finance, 2012) 
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reform has therefore to be very well conducted to avoid the risk of worsening the 
economic and social situation of the most vulnerable parts of the population. Finally 
there is a political aspect that plays a very important role in the post-revolutionary 
context. After the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, the country has yet to build itself again, 
it has no democratic tradition and the country thus lacks experience of democratic 
participation. Any actor taking power has to undergo a lot of pressure and resistance 
from an opposition that would not miss any opportunity to criticize its actions. In a 
situation of political transition, stability is a difficult goal. Hence any government is 
reluctant to take unpopular decisions that might jeopardize its stability and survival. 
Furthermore, there is a strong ongoing struggle for power, so any mistake might make 
one party loose popular support and would signify a loss of power. A fact that could 
be very harmful, considering the perspective of legislative or presidential elections.  
 
When it comes to the international pressure, clearly the biggest pressure is the one 
stemming from donors and investors, which are both represented by the IMF. Indeed, 
an agreement on the IMF loan would be kind of a green light for other donors to lend 
money to Egypt and for investors to invest in the country, as it would give them a sort 
of guarantee of the country's solvency. Even if there are no conditions to the loan, any 
measures taken to improve the macro-economic situation, has to suit IMF ideology. 
Since they are not in favor of high taxes, which for them distort the market because 
they are a disincentive for production, the main measure that can be taken is cutting 
public expenditures. As noted above, subsidies are probably the budget line where 
there is most room for reforms and cuts. Even if food subsidies represent fewer 
expenses than fuel subsidies, the IMF is nevertheless pushing for reforms that would 
lead to a shift towards cash transfers. On the other hand, the Ministry of Supply is 
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closely advised by the World Food Programme that is not in favor of a total shift to 
cash transfers. The WFP defends the necessity of in-kind food subsidies. It eventually 
plays a role of balance. It is also the organ that advocates for the population. Their 
priority is the food security of households. They are not looking at the fiscal aspect in 
detail, but rather on the effect on the ground and on populations. They do not have a 
means of pressure in order to influence the government. But their main concern being 
the population, the government readily listens to them because the population's will is 
a big pressure in the decision-making process.  
 
 
6.3. Position of international agencies 
The IMF is in favor of a food subsidy reform because they do not find the actual 
program to be efficient and highlight that it fails to accomplish its mission since the 
poor benefit only partly of it. In addition to their high cost, extended social public 
policies, like the one conducted for subsidies in Egypt, distort the market. They 
advocate replacing it with a cash transfer for the poorest part of the population, which 
would reduce spending considerably.  
 
The World Bank holds a similar opinion; they severely criticize the inefficiency of the 
current system with its huge leakages. Although they support the idea of cash-transfer 
in general, they do also recognize the necessity of in-kind food subsidies, but are still 
in favor of excluding 40 to 60 percent of the population from those benefits.  
 
The World Food Program endorses the need for reforms in the food subsidy system in 
Egypt. They agree on the need of better targeting in order to include the poor that are 
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excluded from the program and to exclude the rich who benefit from subsidies they do 
not need.  However, they still emphasize on the necessity of in-kind food subsidies in 
the current situation. A cash transfer system alone would not be able to respond to the 
irregularity of food prices and a system of adaptation would be very complicated to 
implement since the price can vary widely from one region to the other. They think 
however that the composition of the subsidized basket should be modified in order to 
bring better nutritional value; it should also take into account the regional preferences. 
They are also active in a campaign of bread fortification, which aims to enhance the 
nutritional quality of the subsidized baladi bread.   
 
 
6.4. Negotiation positions between IMF and the Egyptian government 
The negotiations between the government of Egypt and the IMF have been taking 
place since 2011. Until the day this work is being finalized, no agreement has been 
reached. In a first place, the SCAF refused an agreement with a low interest rate of 
only 1.5 percent and favorable terms. This can probably be explained by the bad 
reputation of the IMF in Egypt and the unwillingness of the SCAF as an interim 
government at that time to take important decisions. Indeed, the SCAF justified their 
refusal by the reluctance of the population to borrow from the IMF again. Probably, as 
they were here only as a transitional government, the SCAF just did not want to risk 
taking an unpopular decision or even just an important decision. Then, when the 
Muslim Brotherhood came to power, having to deal with the very ill economic 
situation of the country, they reengaged in negotiations for a 4.8 billion dollar loan. 
However, the situation has changed and the conditions of the loan became less 
favorable. The IMF would not accept any agreement without sufficient adjustment 
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measures that would guarantee an improvement of the fiscal deficit. Two main 
reasons, both political, can be identified to explain why no agreement has been 
reached yet. First, the Muslim Brotherhood in power was very reluctant to take 
economic measures such as reforming the subsidy system, because they feared to 
loose popularity in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Furthermore, 
because the government of Mohamed Morsi was already weak and suffering from 
instability, cuts in public spending might have threatened his position. Second, the 
IMF was not ready to sign an agreement with a government that was isolated from 
other political powers. In the absence of a broad based political will, the IMF feared 
that the structural adjustment cannot be implemented. This is why in Spring 2013 they 
started to meet with opposition figures to discuss the loan. Regarding food subsidies 
in the negotiation, it is difficult to evaluate to which extent they are important in them. 
Surely, the reform of energy subsidies is more important to the IMF, since it is a more 
costly program. It might also be that talks on food subsidies are more sensitive for the 
financial institution because it does not want to face the same accusations as in the 
past, when UNICEF criticized the harmful nutritional effects of structural adjustment 
policies on the population.  
As said previously, the IMF looks more at the outcomes now. Most probably, 
reforming food subsidies is not an explicit requirement for the loan, but since the GoE 
is asked to rationalize its macro-economic situation and the current food subsidy 
system being inefficient, it would necessarily be part of it.  This hypothesis can also 
be reinforced by the fact that the delegations coming to Cairo were always suggesting 
a cash program financed by the World Bank as an alternative to in-kind food 
subsidies. Food subsidies are therefore tackled in the negotiations between the IMF 
and the GoE. However, they are not the main and central element in those 
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discussions, but one issue among many others. There are many other reasons for the 
deadlock of the negotiations besides the lack of commitment for food subsidy 
reforms. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
In the debate about food subsidies in Egypt, everybody agrees on the necessity of 
reform and on the unsustainable character of the current system. The divergences of 
all involved parties are about the extent of this reform. Furthermore, everybody seems 
to agree on the finality of cash transfers replacing in-kind food subsidies, since such a 
system is in fact more efficient economically. Yet, while the IMF is for an immediate 
transition to cash transfers, other UN agencies like the WFP claim that such a 
program is not yet appropriate for Egypt due to the high prevalence of poverty in the 
country and the instability of prices. A cash transfer system would then not be able to 
ensure a sufficient level of security for the most vulnerable part of the population in 
the current situation.  
 
Additionally, there is a general agreement on the need for a better-targeted system in 
order to include the poorest parts of the population and to exclude those who do not 
need subsidies on food items. This question is, however, very sensitive because it is 
very difficult to evaluate who actually needs these subsidies and who should be 
excluded from the program. Only the World Bank dared to bring numbers by 
advocating for an exclusion of 40 to 60 percent of the population, this 
recommendation was, however, very broad and is not clear on which criteria should 
be determined who does and who does not need subsidies. The other problem with the 
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exclusion is, that it might cause a loss of support from the population to the program. 
Indeed, people who would not benefit anymore from the subsidies might oppose its 
fairness and legitimacy. This might actually be a reason why there had never been any 
serious attempt to improve the targeting of the program. When it comes to 
international agencies, the IMF might possess significant means of pressure for 
reducing expenses on food subsidies which would be part of the economic adjustment 
required to rebalance the budget in order to receive their 4.8 billion loan that would 
open the door for investors in the country. However, organizations like the WFP also 
have a great impact on the government’s decisions. Indeed, they are somehow the 
people's voice in the debate; with their great field experience they have collected a 
good knowledge of what the people need. The people being a great strength in the 
post-revolutionary context in Egypt, their needs cannot be ignored in the decision-
making process.  
 
Even though international organizations have a certain influence on the decision-
making, the issue of reforming food subsidies remains mainly one of domestic policy. 
The political situation of the transition prevents any serious attempt to reforming the 
subsidy system. No government managed, until the time this research is being 
conducted, to get enough legitimacy to conduct such a sensitive reform. Actually, any 
government that would start this reform would necessarily be criticized by its 
opponents for its mistakes and its ineffectiveness and those, in turn, would be used to 
destabilize its survival. There are too many strategic aspects in the current context 
paralyzing any concrete decision. It will therefore not be possible to engage in any 
reforms as long as the different parties see only their own ideological prospective for 
the country and are not ready to cooperate for its overall well-being. The absence of a 
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significant legitimacy and a broad political base makes it very unlikely in the current 
situation for any government to being able to introduce a substantial, acceptable and 
sustainable solution to the problem of food subsidies.  
 
A solution to break this deadlock could be to create a commission on food subsidy 
reform that would include representatives of every political force, of the Ministry of 
Supply and the Ministry of Finance, and of international organizations like the World 
Food Programme and the IMF. Independent consultants could also be consulted if 
needed. Such a commission that would focus only on this specific issue could help 
finding a compromise and going beyond the political disputes and rivalries since its 
outcome – success or failure - could less easily be imputed to one single political 
force. The positive aspect regarding this issue is that, currently, the gap between the 
different political actors in Egypt is concentrated on issues like the level of 
conservatism or the place of religion in the state; the issue of food subsidy reform is 
likely to face smaller differences of opinion. Such a commission could help drafting 
the principle elements of a way forward for reforms that should then be implemented 
by the Ministry of Supply. Before the implementation stage, it will be crucial to 
inform and prepare well the population for the upcoming changes in order to make 
them more acceptable.  
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